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Abstract  
This article provides an analysis of how slave women, during the period from the American Revolution to the 
Civil War, filed civil suits for their freedom in the county courts. The cases occurred primarily in the Upper 
South. It is argued in this article that it was only as property - being part of an estate, cited in an deed of 
indenture, freed in a last will and testament, being imported into a state against the law, living with their owners 
or their owners' knowledge in free territory - that slaves were permitted to file such suits; but when they did, 
they were often successful, in large measure due to talented lawyers. This article also compares the legal 
process of manumission in the United States South with emancipation in other slave societies in the Americas, 
suggesting that the experience in the United States was in many ways unique. The article concludes with a brief 
comparison of the suits for freedom brought by women and those brought by men, offering data to reveal that 
there were more similarities than differences between the genders.  




In 1835, 19-year-old Polly Anderson, a slave, filed a suit in the Chesterfield County, Virginia, Chancery Court. 
Accompanied by James Burnett, a white man acting as her guardian, she traced her ancestry back to 1815, when 
her grandmother Amey and her mother Letty were freed under the 1805 will of Jordan Anderson Sr and 
registered as free persons of colour. Polly Anderson then explained that, despite the fact that Amey and Letty 
had legally gained their freedom and registered at the county courthouse as free women of colour, she was 
turned over, when a young girl, to Edward Elam and held by him as a slave. Elam knew very well that she was 
born free and 'not in law bound to serve him a day', yet he sold her to William Watts, who took her to Hanover 
County and turned her over to his uncle, Robert White, a slave trader well known for 'purchasing negroes in 
Virginia & transporting them to Louisiana & Mississippi for sale in those states, on speculation'. She did not 
know if 'she was sold as a slave absolutely, or only until she should attain her age of twenty one years'. Fearing 
it would be 'extremely difficult, if not impossible, for her ever to assert her right to freedom with success' if she 
were sent to 'some distant part of the United States', Polly Anderson sued Edward Elam, William Watts and 
Robert White, asking the court to restrain any one of them or anyone else from taking her out of the state. She 
asked the sheriff of Hanover County to take her into custody and hire her out until 'her right to freedom shall be 
finally decreed'.1 
In recent years, historians have examined many aspects of slavery in the Americas, including the unique role of 
slave women. In the anthology titled Women and Slavery: The Modern Atlantic, Claire Robertson and Marsha 
Robinson urge readers 'not simply to add women to the mixture in order to achieve mainstream status' but to put 
the female slave experience at centre stage. A number of the volume's essays do exactly that. In studies of 
slavery in Brazil, Jamaica, Barbados, the French Caribbean and the United States South, historians have 
examined how slave women, as mothers, care givers, objects of an owners' lust, and labourers, confronted 
unique problems. In an article titled 'Slave women and Reproduction in Jamaica', Kenneth Morgan shows how 
the onerous demands imposed on mothers working on sugar plantations and the lack of a proper diet caused 
heavy infant mortality. In his article on Louisiana slave women, Richard Follett presents an interpretation of the 
various ways in which black women reclaimed their own bodies, frustrated the planters' efforts to encourage 
reproduction, and 'defied white male construction of their sexuality'. Other recent historians have focused on the 
unique experiences of slave women in legal matters. Camillia Cowling explores the preponderance of individual 
court appeals that were presented by slave women in Havana, Cuba, to gain free status or achieve better 
working conditions. In her article on enslaved women in the post-Revolutionary Carolinas, Laura Edwards 
argues that 'enslaved women occupied acknowledged spaces within southern law and even shaped its 
application and content'. Focusing on court cases between 1787 and 1840, Edwards emphasises how, at the 
local level, the personalised nature of the legal process gave black women 'influence and presence in law'.2 
This essay tests whether placing 'the female slave experience at center stage' is indeed the most useful way of 
understanding the slave experience, at least with regard to women, slavery and the law. It does so by examining 
freedom suits, such as the one presented by Polly Anderson, in order to understand the role and operation of the 
law in the American South and to compare it with other slave societies in the Americas. How could an illiterate 
teenage female slave know about her family's genealogy, obtain a white guardian and secure counsel? How did 
her suit differ from the suits brought by male slaves? And how did the legal structure in the United States differ 
from the structure in other slave societies? Drawn from a new body of evidence - local court records - this essay 
analyses how, when and why slave women brought legal action against their owners and other whites, how they 
argued their cases before judges and juries, and what these actions tell us about the South's peculiar institution 
and slavery in the Americas.3 
Residing primarily in the Upper South and Louisiana, the black women who filed freedom suits relied on 
lawyers - variously termed attorneys, solicitors, counsel - to prepare complaints, file petitions and request 
subpoenas. They obtained legal counsel in a variety of ways. In some states, when a will that included a grant or 
promise of freedom was probated or an emancipation deed was entered in the court records, a local judge 
appointed a lawyer to represent the black people involved. Slaves seeking to gain freedom also found support 
among members of their owners' families, or whites in the neighbourhood who knew about an owner's wish to 
manumit certain slaves. It is reasonable to assume that those slaves who knew of their late owner's intention to 
free them would complain to anyone who would listen about remaining enslaved after their owner had legally 
manumitted them, or their term of servitude had expired. Still others somehow got word of their illegal 
enslavement to lawyers who were known to be sympathetic to the plight of black people or entertained anti-
slavery sentiments. A few slaves contacted solicitors themselves, especially if they lived in towns and cities or 
in areas where it was known that certain lawyers were willing to take on such cases as a matter of principle.4 
Some of those lawyers espoused anti-slavery, even abolitionist, sentiments. In Delaware, Richard Bassett, an 
abolitionist who introduced the state law to prohibit the sale of African-Americans to the Carolinas, Georgia or 
the West Indies, filed nine law suits on behalf of female slave clients.5 During the 1820s, while serving on the 
Supreme Court of Missouri, Mathias McGirk served as legal counsel for several black women and their children 
and grandchildren, and his firm of Farris, Gamble, and McGirk represented a number of other coloured 
women.6 During the late 1840s and early 1850s, Jean Charles David, an anti-slavery lawyer in New Orleans, 
argued cases before the Orleans Parish District Court on behalf of a number of slave women who had travelled 
with their owners to France.7 
Yet, most solicitors defending women of colour were not abolitionists nor were they opposed to slavery. Indeed, 
a number were themselves slave owners. They took the cases to enforce the law and in defence of legal 
principles. When they learned that an owner or heirs to an estate reneged on a promise of freedom, they felt it 
was their duty to bring such matters to the attention of the court.8 When they learned that a free black had been 
arrested as a runaway and incarcerated, they felt it was their duty to help with the defence. In Maryland and the 
District of Columbia, Francis Scott Key and John Boucher Morris represented a number of black clients, 
including Mary Queen of Charles County in her suit against Father Charles Neal of the Roman Catholic Church. 
Key defended slaves pro bono but he also defended the rights of slave owners and, on one occasion, prosecuted 
an abolitionist agitator.9 In Virginia, slaveholding lawyers Richard Bird, Richard Chambliss Sr, David May and 
Richard Logan defended black clients. May, who owned between 12 and 17 slaves, pleaded the case of Jane, a 
slave who had been freed under the 1831 will of her late owner Edward Lanier but was kept in bondage for five 
years to pay for her owner's debts. Several judgments were levied against Jane, May explained, and she was 
held in the county jail. The proceedings against her were 'harsh & oppressive'. Logan, who owned 113 slaves, 
argued for the release of six blacks - four adults, including Mary, Patsey, Jacob and Samuel, and two children, 
Matilda and Meriweather, as specified by the last will and testament of Philip E. Vass. 'I have examined the 
facts and Circumstances on which the petitioners claim the right to freedom which are Correctly stated in the 
forgoing petition', Logan informed the Judge of the Superior court in Halifax County.10 
Whether slave owners or not, lawyers were guided in their arguments by statute law. In Delaware, Maryland 
and Virginia, laws prohibited the importation or exportation of slaves by slave traders and non-slave owners, 
and required the imposition of heavy penalties upon violators. The laws were passed less for humanitarian 
reasons than out of fear that outside slaves might disrupt the slave system. If any person or persons shall bring 
any 'Negro or Mulatto slave into this state for sale or otherwise', an 1787 Delaware law read, 'the said Negro or 
Mulatto slave is there by declared free'. In addition, the violator would be subject to a fine of 20 pounds, with 
half that sum going to the informant.11 Another law, passed in 1795 in Virginia, allowed persons illegally 
detained as slaves, including those freed by wills or deeds, the right to sue and be assigned counsel, and 
subsequent laws detailed how these suits should be presented to the courts: magistrates would issue a warrant 
summoning the presumed owner to court; defendants were required to answer the allegations, post security 
bonds 'equal at least to the full value of such complainant', and appear at the next session of the superior, county 
or corporation court. Plaintiffs without funds could sue in forma pauperis, and the same strictness 'as to form', 
as one judicial decision explained, 'is not required in actions for freedom as in other cases'.12 In 1786, Maryland 
courts began permitting oral evidence of slave petitioners' white ancestry in freedom suits; seven years later 
lawmakers transferred manumission cases from the general court to the county courts and required owners to 
provide proof of ownership. Solicitors were aware of the criminal proceedings that could be brought against 
anyone kidnapping and selling free blacks into bondage, although they could only bring civil cases on behalf of 
their enslaved clients caught up in such a situation.13 
Besides state statutes, lawyers cited the final article of the 1787 Northwest Ordinance: 'There shall be neither 
slavery nor involuntary servitude in the said territory, otherwise than in punishment of crimes, whereof the party 
shall have been duly convicted'. Although provisions were made for the return of slaves who had fled to the 
Territory, those who were brought by their owners to what later became Ohio, Indiana, Illinois, Michigan and 
Wisconsin, and resided there, came under the Ordinance's original prohibition. Those who were born of free 
mothers but held in bondage came under colonial statutes and precedents established by partus sequitur 
ventrem, which meant that the child inherited the condition of the mother, rather than that of the father as would 
have been the case under common law. In Louisiana, lawyers argued that free coloured immigrants from the 
Caribbean should retain their status in the United States. Thus, lawyers cited state laws, federal statutes and 
legal precedent to defend their black clients.14 
Although most slave women were not familiar with these laws and precedents, they contributed a great deal to 
aid their own causes. In their suits, some female slaves offered detailed genealogical information to support 
their claim to freedom, be it a right earned at the end of their term of servitude or acquired in compliance with 
the terms of their owners' will or deed of emancipation. Considering the short life span of slaves (those who 
reached age of 21 lived another 17 years on average), information such as when children were born and the 
status of the mother at the time of birth could be vitally important. Indeed, knowledge about family history 
could mean the difference between remaining in slavery and gaining freedom. In a typical case, a Maryland 
slaveholder executed a deed of manumission in 1787 for Hannah and six other slaves, freeing them at various 
times in the future. The deed stipulated that the children and grandchildren of the slaves were to be granted their 
freedom when they reached age 23. Many years later, Hannah's daughter Grace, born in 1792, obtained her 
freedom under the will, but her granddaughter Lemman, born about 1816, remained in bondage. In her civil 
suit, filed in St Louis, Missouri, in 1834, the granddaughter explained that her mother was 23 in 1815 and when 
she, Lemman, was born, in June 1816, she was therefore born of a free mother and should be declared a free 
woman of colour.15 
There were a number of petitions which, as did the one presented by Lemman, traced families back a generation 
or two, and a few that told of mothers, grandmothers, even great grandmothers who were free. Women cited 
names, places, dates, owners, wills, deeds, marriage contracts, and, on occasion, referred to court records to 
prove how and when their ancestors had gained their freedom. 'Pleas', or 'causes', as civil suits were called, were 
filed by women belonging to three groups: women whose term of servitude had expired and were thus entitled 
to be legally free, women who were kept in bondage after they had been legally manumitted, and free black 
women who were kidnapped and held as slaves. Despite the different circumstances of their enslavement, the 
women presented similar arguments: their owners or others violated state laws; their owners or others 
disregarded the Northwest Ordinance; the wishes of owners who, in wills, deeds, indentures and other legal 
documents, had set them or their ancestors free were ignored or foiled. 
For a variety of reasons - loyalty, intelligence, special skills, industry, 'meritorious service', sexual relationships 
with owners or other white males, giving birth to an owner's child - some slave women were promised their 
freedom in the future. Becoming what was known as a 'term slave', that is a slave entitled to freedom after 
serving a number of years or when reaching a certain age, was rare in the Lower South but fairly common in 
Delaware, Maryland, the District of Columbia, and in some towns and cities of the Upper South. Both slaves 
and owners benefited from such an arrangement: slaves gained the promise of liberty for themselves and 
possibly for their children; owners gained a certain measure of loyalty from those they promised to release from 
bondage. Most often these arrangements were set down in legal documents specifying that the women so named 
would gain their freedom after an owner's death, or following the death of his widow, or when they attained a 
certain age. In 1806, Maryland slave owner Joshua Morris executed a deed of manumission for Patience, Rhoda 
and several other slaves; they should be freed, he said, when they turned 21 years of age. In 1819, in his will, he 
reiterated his intent to emancipate the slaves, now including Patience and her three children (Juliet, Levin and 
George), David, and Rhoda and her three children (Arthur, Nathan and Peggy). Meanwhile, he permitted them 
'to go at large and enjoy their freedom from the time limited in said deed of manumission to the time of his 
death'.16 One Missouri owner stipulated in a bill of sale that his 11-year-old slave Malinda as well as her 
brothers and sisters, who were being sold to Joseph Smith of Nashville, Tennessee, should be freed when they 
arrived 'at the age of twenty-five or twenty-eight years'.17 Other owners not only freed female slaves when they 
reached a certain age but also their children. One Tennessee man, who arranged for the future manumission of a 
favourite female slave, said that her children should also be manumitted: the females when they reached age 27, 
the males when they reached age 30.18 Of course, such arrangements were often in the distant future. Owners 
died, widows died, even slave owners' children died while the slaves who were to be freed remained legally 
enslaved. As the years passed and these black families expanded, they often became a significant part of an 
owner's estate. Term slaves discovered that their owners' heirs and family members sought to keep them 
enslaved rather than give up such valuable property. As a consequence, administrators of estates, executors of 
wills, widows, heirs, children, creditors, business partners and others used various means to subvert the original 
intentions of a slave owner. Although most of the slave women knew about the promise of freedom for 
themselves and their children, an owner's family members sometimes 'lost', hid or destroyed the legal 
documents - last will and testaments, bills of sale, deeds, act of indenture - that contained information about 
freeing the slaves at some time in the future. 
It was under such circumstances that term slaves presented arguments to the county courts. It will never be 
known how many women were promised their freedom and never obtained it. Indeed, a few probably never 
knew that they were to be freed. But of those who were aware of the promise of freedom, most knew exactly 
how long they were to remain in bondage. In their petitions, they told of broken promises, greedy heirs, fears of 
being sold, the sale of their children, being taken away by slave traders; they told about deceit, treachery and 
avarice. A 19-year-old District of Columbia woman named Helen was promised her freedom after 12 years of 
service. When her owner made arrangements to sell her unexpired term for 140 dollars, she protested; but 
trusting the potential purchaser's 'promises of good treatment, & his solemn declaration in the presence of a 
number of witnesses, that he did not buy her for the purpose of selling her again', she agreed to work until the 
end of her term. No sooner had the deal been struck than her new owner, Henry Drain, whom she described as a 
near-penniless Irishman, took her aboard a steamboat, transported her to Fredericksburg, Virginia, and offered 
to sell her for 300 dollars. At this point, Helen broke loose, dived into the river, and began to swim away only to 
be overtaken by Drain and dragged to the shore, not to prevent 'the destruction of her life', she said, but to 
protect his investment. Observing this confrontation, the woman who had agreed to buy Helen, 'touched either 
with fear or compassion', refused to complete the transaction. When they returned to the District of Columbia, 
Helen was able to get away from Drain, contact a lawyer and file a civil suit, seeking an injunction to prevent 
him from removing her from the District while her suit was pending. She also asked for a decree prohibiting 
him from selling her for more years than she was required to serve.19 Other term slaves related similar 
experiences and presented similar remonstrances, as the petitions were sometimes called, to protect themselves 
and their children.20 
The efforts of female term slaves to force their owners, estate heirs, slave traders and others to abide by various 
legal documents mirrored the struggles of manumitted slaves who sought to secure and maintain their freedom 
after being emancipated. They, too, were forced to file suits to validate a will, deed, covenant, contract or verbal 
promise. They, too, fought against greedy heirs, antagonistic widows and hostile family members. They, too, 
suffered as the prices for slaves outside the north-eastern corner of the upper South - Delaware, Maryland and 
the District of Columbia - rose sharply and made the illegal transportation and sale of black people from that 
area to other sections of the South extremely profitable. It was probably more difficult for manumitted slaves 
than for term slaves to prove their free legal status since they often had less opportunity to know what had been 
written in wills and deeds than to know what was written in contracts of indentures. In any event, many women 
who should have been freed were kept in bondage. Although the precise number is not known, the observation 
of Mariah Cole, a literate Delaware slave who signed her name and added next to her signature, in parentheses, 
'almost white', suggests that it was significant. She commented in 1800 that the 'sending to foreign parts 
Coloured people entitled to their Liberty is become somewhat fashionable in the Lower parts of this state'.21 
Other manumitted female slaves told of the ways they and their children were deceived, defrauded, jailed and 
sold; how years passed while they and their children remained in bondage despite the expressed wishes of their 
owners; how they were hired out over extended periods. It was often difficult for these women to resist, to run 
away or to defy their owners, as the punishments meted to them would also be inflicted upon their children. If 
they were fortunate enough to gain the ear of whites who might help them bring their cause to court, they still 
faced the possibility of their children being sold, of brutal retaliation by a presumed owner, or of themselves 
being sold out of the district before any action could be taken. Following her owner's death in Georgia, the slave 
Mary was transported by an heir to East Baton Rouge, Louisiana. In 1822 Mary learned that her original owner 
had directed in his 1809 will that she should be manumitted in 1815. An heir of the estate, Marian Morris, and 
her husband, Gerald Morris, never informed Mary of her 'rights' and kept her in slavery. Later, Mary and her 
two children, Judy and William, were sold to Jerry Morris, another family member. Seven years after she 
should have been freed Mary somehow discovered the contents of her former owner's will. Her two children 
had been 'lost' to her, they were either sold or had died, but she had five other children, who had been born after 
the date set for her emancipation and who therefore should be free. When Jerry Morris died and the curator for 
the absent heirs to his estate made plans to 'carry her & her five children out the Jurisdiction' of the court, Mary 
filed a suit for her freedom and that of her children.22 
Many similar cases could be summarised that would reveal the remarkable efforts and struggles of slave women 
to secure for themselves and their children the freedom that had been promised to them. Sometimes many years 
passed before the women filed their suits, despite knowledge that they were being illegally held; at other times 
they did so as soon as they discovered they and their children should be freed. In some cases they said that their 
owners had always been attached to them and their children, and that they had served their masters faithfully 
and 'meritoriously'; in other cases they told about the specific provisions in wills and deeds that promised them 
or their children freedom: they should be freed and then taken to a free state, or, as slave owner Sally Mahan 
had stipulated concerning her slave Nancy and Nancy's six children, they should be taken to a free state and 
then freed, or they should be freed and transported to Liberia. Following the death of her owner, Kentucky slave 
Rachel Bell told the court that her owner had instructed his executor to free his slaves when they reached age 
21. Each one of them, according to the will, should be given the opportunity of 'going to Liberia or Some place 
of freedom out of the bounds of these United States'. At age 21, Rachel Bell said that she and her new baby 
named French were denied such an opportunity. The owner's son had sold them at a private sale. In her freedom 
suit, Rachel Bell asked for a restraining order to prevent the whites who now held her from taking her and 
French to some distant location.23 
Free women of colour who were illegally held as slaves also presented their petitions to the county courts. In 
some instances their arguments were similar to those of the first two groups, but with one difference: they 
claimed an inherent right to freedom, rather than a right based on a promise contained in an owner's indenture, 
emancipation deed or last will and testament. Some claimed that they were born of free mothers, others that 
they had been born in free states or free territories, others that they had been kidnapped and sold into bondage, 
others that they were taken away from their loved ones and held by their captors, and still others that they were 
arrested and incarcerated as runaway slaves. Many women who found themselves in these situations could not 
prove their free status. Who would believe the assertions of a woman jailed as a runaway slave that she was in 
fact free and entitled to the status of a free woman? For the few who, by good fortune or fortuitous 
circumstances, were able to contact sympathetic whites and seek redress in the courts, it was necessary to prove 
the reverse of what appeared to be true. By the colour of their skin they were deemed to be slaves. In legal terms 
and in their standing before the court, they were 'guilty' until proven innocent.24 
Claiming free lineage from whites was one line of argument in support of the claim to liberty. So, too, was 
arguing that a female ancestor could be traced back to Native Americans, or that either they or their parents had 
lived in a free territory, a free state or a free country. Those who made these claims did so by tracing family 
histories back over many years, sometimes several generations (six being the most) in order to explain when 
and where they were born, who had held them in bondage at various times, how they had come to be taken to 
regions where slavery was outlawed, how long they had remained in those areas before being taken back into 
the slave states. Thus, decades before the Harriett and Dred Scott cases, slaves argued that they had lived in 
areas where slavery was outlawed and should therefore be granted their freedom.25 
In the Upper South and Louisiana, free black women told stories of how they and their children had been 
abducted and sold as slaves. Women were more vulnerable than men to being kidnapped and sold into bondage, 
or subdued and held as slaves, for not only was it harder for them, physically, to resist capture, but it was 
virtually impossible for them to abandon their children. Once they had been taken away they found it difficult to 
call on whites to vouch for them, or to prove their status. Free-born Phillis Thomas and her 12 children were 
overpowered one night in St Mary's County, Maryland, put in a wagon, and 'brought by a circuitous route to 
avoid pursuit and detection to the State of Kentucky'. Living in 'a state of involuntary servitude', Thomas feared 
that her abductor, James Burks, planned to move them again, to yet another state, and sell them as slaves for 
life.26 Henrietta Bell, the daughter 'of a free white woman and of a coloured father', was forcibly 'run off' from 
her mother in Virginia and sold as a slave. She commenced a suit for her freedom in Nashville, but her 
pretended owner, James Cummins, took her to Louisville, Kentucky, and now, she feared, planned to remove 
her again and take her 'to strange places' where she would never be able to prove her status as a free woman. 
She also believed that any extended journey would endanger the life of her unborn child.27 Others argued that 
their mothers, grandmothers, and more distant descendants on the female side, were free-born women of colour. 
They asserted that they were 'born of a free woman', 'the daughter of a free woman of colour', the granddaughter 
of a free white woman, or that they 'descended on the female line from a free woman'. 
A mother's residency in free territory could have a profound effect on the status of her children. Winney said 
that her owners, Phebe and John Whitesides, took her from Kentucky to the Indiana Territory in 1795; several 
years later, they moved to Missouri. After arriving in Missouri, Winney gave birth to nine children. She 
contended that her residency in Indiana entitled her and her children to their freedom under the Northwest 
Ordinance. However, Phebe Whitesides claimed ownership of Winney and three of her children, Hannah, Lewis 
and Malinda; John Whitesides claimed ownership of her son Daniel; representatives of the late Thomas 
Whitesides's estate claimed ownership of Winney's son Jerry; Robert Musick claimed ownership of Winney's 
daughter Jenny; Isaac Votean claimed ownership of her daughter Nancy; John Butler claimed ownership of her 
daughter Lydia; and Michael Hutton claimed ownership of her daughter Sarah. In her suit, Winney asked for an 
order 'to enable her to sue for her freedom and as next friend to each of her said children to sue for their 
freedom'.28 
A number of cases filed in Louisiana concerned slaves who asserted their right to freedom for having set foot on 
French soil. During the years after the Louisiana Purchase in 1803 and statehood in 1812, many French Creoles 
(people of French descent born in the Americas) travelled to France for extended stays, often taking trusted 
servants along as cooks, maids, waiters and housekeepers. Upon their return to Louisiana, some of the slaves 
filed suits arguing that they had lived in a country where slavery was not permitted. Indeed, French law declared 
that any slave who set foot on French soil should be immediately freed.29 Another strain of slave complaints 
peculiar to Louisiana concerned free people of colour who arrived in New Orleans from islands of the 
Caribbean during and following the slave revolt led by Toussaint L'Ouverture. Although free born or freed at a 
young age, some of them fled without proof of their status and were taken up as slaves. They found it virtually 
impossible to prove their former status. The women and children were especially vulnerable. The prices they 
could bring at the auction block were higher than anywhere else.30 Unique to Louisiana also were complaints 
demanding monetary damages for being illegally detained in slavery. As one group of black people, 'unjustly, 
illegally & forcibly kidnapped', asserted, not only should they be 'exempt from all obligations of service' but the 
person who held them should be required to pay them for their past 'work & labor'.31 Harriett Scott of St 
Landry Parish, arrested as a fugitive slave, not only sued for a writ of habeas corpus but demanded that the 
Sheriff of St Landry Parish pay her 350 dollars for false imprisonment. Other women asked for up to 10 dollars 
a month for the time they were illegally held in bondage.32 
How slave women fared in the county and parish courts is one of the most remarkable aspects of the freedom 
suits. A statistical analysis of decrees handed down by courts in freedom suits filed by female slaves in the 15 
slaveholding states and the District of Columbia in this study reveals a climate surprisingly favourable to slave 
petitioners. It is true that this finding must be interpreted with a measure of caution as not all petitioners sought 
a final decree on their free status - some requested permission to file suit and to secure protection during the 
judicial process; others asked for the appointment of a lawyer in forma pauperis or an injunction against their 
owners or the heirs of an estate. Nonetheless the numbers do reveal that not only were the courts sympathetic to 
the plight of slaves who filed suits and ready to hear their cases, but that the plaintiffs were successful in their 
quest for freedom far more often than not from one decade to the next in the different states. Among the 
approximately 546 civil suits filed by individual women, women with children, groups of women, groups of 
women and men with children and without, in those states where such civil suits were allowed, the 
overwhelming majority were partly granted or fully granted whereas relatively few were dismissed or denied 
(see Appendix 1). Some of those that were dismissed were done so at the request of the plaintiffs or their 
attorneys. In a few instances the plaintiffs appealed judicial decrees, as did defendants, and though an 
examination of suits on appeal is outside the focus of this paper, it can nevertheless be stated that more appeals 
were decided in favour of the slave women than in favour of owners, heirs and other defendants. Among the 
125 Delaware suits, 83 were decided favourably for slave plaintiffs whereas only three were dismissed or 
denied. In the District of Columbia, 36 of 40 petitions were granted whereas in Maryland 36 were decided 
favourably and 28 were dismissed or denied. In Kentucky, the numbers were 25 granted and 15 dismissed or 
denied, and in Tennessee 15 granted and one dismissed. The same general proportion of favourable decrees can 
be seen in the other states where suits were brought. Although most of the petitions in Missouri were filed to 
begin the legal process rather than to ask for a final decree on freedom, 115 out of 116 pleas were granted, 
suggesting that the courts saw enough merit in those cases to allow them to go forward. Virginia cases resulted 
in 21 favourable decisions and four unfavourable decisions. In Louisiana, the state with many petitions 
dismissed or denied, those granted still outnumbered those rejected: 28 to 23. Even considering that the 
available data are incomplete in terms of final results, the favourable results outstrip the unfavourable ones by a 
large margin, suggesting that in most states, as in Missouri, courts were well disposed to hear cases for freedom, 
if not necessarily granting it in all instances. If the 'no order or decree' and 'other' entries are excluded from the 
total number of petitions, the petitioners' requests were granted or partly granted in 371 cases as compared with 
75 cases where the requests were denied. Consequently, 83% of the suits or partial suits were decided 
favourably, a remarkable percentage considering southern racial attitudes, the power of white families arguing 
against the plaintiffs, fears in the wake of the Nat Turner insurrection, and the growing sectional conflict. Even 
if the cases with no outcomes are included in the total, the margin is still weighted in favour of the plaintiffs. 
Two questions remain. First, how did the process of filing freedom suits in the Upper South and Louisiana 
compare with the path to freedom available in other slave societies in the Americas? Second, does an analysis 
of petitions filed by female slaves offer a special insight into and allow us to better understand the legal struggle 
for freedom in the United States? In other slave societies in the Americas, slave women and men used tradition 
and the law to acquire their freedom. In Brazil, slaves were permitted through longstanding customs to amass a 
peculio (savings) large enough to indemnify their price and obtain a 'letter of liberty', a custom that was 
eventually enacted into law in 1871. In addition, although they could not sue in their own right, they could and 
did petition the courts through their curador, a legal guardian or trustee, for their freedom, provided that either 
they had been promised free status by their owners or they had paid their purchase price. An owner, however, 
could revoke a slave's liberty after it was granted.33 In Cuba, and perhaps in other Spanish colonies, slaves 
possessed the customary right of coartaci n, purchasing themselves or their children by agreeing to pay an 
owner an initial fixed sum and the balance in instalments as determined by prevailing market values. They also 
possessed the customary right of pedir papel (request paper), that is the right to seek a new owner. In 1842 these 
customary rights were codified into law and accepted by many justices and jurists as true legal rights, to be 
respected even against the will of owners.34 In Martinique, Guadeloupe and French Guiana, three French 
colonies of the Caribbean, slave women and men became the beneficiaries of rachet (redemption) whereby they 
could purchase their freedom from their owners for a fixed sum, so long as they and their owners could agree 
upon an acceptable price.35 As these customs and laws evolved during the nineteenth century, increasing 
numbers of bondsmen and bondswomen in these and other slave societies in the Americas became part of a 
rapidly growing free coloured population. 
There were no such trends towards facilitating the acquisition of freedom in the United States. In many ways 
just the opposite was true. In the Lower South, state laws severely restricted, even prohibited, manumissions, 
whereas in the Upper South it became increasingly difficult to move from slavery to freedom. Nowhere in the 
United States South did customs or laws require slave owners to accept the purchase price of a slave in 
exchange for freedom, allow slaves to use their savings to indemnify a purchase price, or permit those in 
bondage to pay for themselves or their children in instalments. Self-purchase did occur in the United States but 
it was only through a private agreement between slave and owner, not enforceable by custom or law. Owners 
could and sometimes did renege on such agreements, as did the owner of Virginia slave Fanny Smith who 
promised to free her and her two children if she paid him with her extra earnings over a period of 10 years. 
Shortly before the final payment was to be made, Fanny was sold.36 Another stark difference compared with 
other slave societies was the multitude of state and federal laws, including the laws regulating the exportation 
and importation of slaves, the procedures to file suits and obtain counsel, and the claims of freedom based on 
residency in free territory. Such 'local' laws contrasted with the national enactments governing slavery in the 
Caribbean and South America. Finally, in the United States, the arguments contained in freedom suits retraced 
what had occurred in the past and revolved around slaves as property; in other societies the custom and law 
revolved around future prospects such as self-purchase and around slaves as persons. It is ironic that, as the 
doors to freedom opened in many slave societies in the Americas and appeared to be closing in the United 
States South, slaves in the Upper South and Louisiana did gain access to county courts and through that process 
obtained favourable rulings. They used a wide range of arguments in their petitions, all staking their rights on 
past circumstances and events that should determine the present: they had been born of free black or white or 
Indian mothers, their term of servitude had expired, their owner had freed them in a will, deed or act of 
manumission, or they had resided in a free state, free territory or free country. 
As to the question of the value of freedom suits filed by female slaves to our understanding of the struggle for 
freedom in the United States, a comparison of petitions filed by female and male slaves reveals that, although 
there were some differences between them, there were also a number of similarities in the types of cases 
brought to court and the arguments presented. The major difference is in that a much larger number of women 
filed freedom suits with their children or the children of others than did men: 70 slave women, or 7% of the 
nearly 1000 cases in this study, as opposed to only one man. This probably reflects more the attitudes of 
masters, who connected mothers with children in deeds and wills, rather than the inclinations of the slaves 
themselves. Otherwise, the statistical evidence suggests that male slaves were as deeply involved as were 
women slaves in the process of seeking freedom through the local courts. Single males suing for freedom 
outnumber single females by a substantial margin (440 as compared with 368, or 55% to 45%). The small 
number of multiple males petitioning together exceeds those of females (14 as compared with eight). A total of 
42 males and females filed suit together with children (about 5%) and 44 males and females filed suit together 
without children. Men were only slightly less apt to present extensive genealogical trees to prove their freedom; 
when they did, however, they were as likely to list members of their families two and three generations removed 
as were their female counterparts. Men also used many of the same legal arguments used by women, including 
residency, free ancestry, kidnapping and expired term of servitude. They also asked the courts to issue 
injunctions, subpoenas, writs of habeas corpus, bonds and protective arrest warrants. 
It is evident that, in the growing body of scholarship on women and slavery, the discussions about many aspects 
of bondage are strengthened by including gender as one of the many ingredients of the larger picture. Indeed, it 
is hoped that this study will add to that scholarship by demonstrating how the very act of filing freedom suits 
placed enslaved women in a position where they could confront, react to and illuminate the slavery experience. 
For, by the very act of claiming their freedom, slave women transformed themselves from individuals who were 
relentlessly exploited by an institution to those who sought to forge their own future. Therefore, not only does 
this study add gender to the mixture in the understanding of slavery but it follows Claire Robertson's and 
Marsha Robinson's admonition to put the female slave experience at centre stage. In fact, it does so in a direct 
and immediate way by letting the women speak in their own voices and through the medium of their personal 
history. Yet this study does more than that; it expands its focus beyond the specific issues confronting female 
slaves filing for freedom into a comparative understanding of the legal environment in which enslaved 
individuals, men and women, operated to assert their right to freedom in both the United States and other parts 
of the Americas, and thereby broadens and deepens our understanding of the institution. The importance of 
conducting such broad, comparative analyses, in order to complement gender-centric studies, for our 
understanding of slavery applies not only to the study of slavery and the law, as revealed in the statistical 
evidence from the local courts in the United States South, but even to the examinations of infant mortality, 
infanticide, prolonged nursing practices, and taboos against the resumption of intercourse after birth. Kenneth 
Morgan's detailed analysis of 'Slave women and Reproduction in Jamaica', mentioned at the beginning of this 
study, emphasises the onerous work demands placed on slave women working on sugar plantations and the lack 
of proper nutrition, namely determining environmental factors, as the cause of heavy infant mortality rather than 
the 'agency' of slave women in resisting biological reproduction as a political statement against the system of 
slavery. Richard Follett's article about slave women in the sugar parishes of Louisiana reveals the same 
interpretation of the female slave experience. 37 Indeed, perhaps the best way to understand the dynamics and 
complexity of the human experience of bondage in the United States and elsewhere is to broaden rather than 
narrow our focus, and to examine the impact of the institution's environmental factors on enslaved individuals 
as well as how those individuals confronted that environment, and thereby to keep in mind the maxim that 'all 
history is comparative'. 
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Notes: *Includes single females; multiple females; females with children; females and males with children; 
females and males without children. **'Other' includes 'annulled', 'abated' (due to the death of one of the 
parties), 'non-suit' (where the legal basis for bringing action was denied), 'agreement' between the parties, 
'plaintiff not found in county'. Source: Computed from Race and Slavery Petitions Project Database. 
Occasionally female slaves sued with a white person as a 'next friend', or friend of the court, but this was rare. 
In all cases, the legal status of the petitioners was derived from the designation given them by the court. Thus, 
free blacks illegally enslaved were considered slaves until they could prove that they were free. The profiles 
above reveal a good deal about the availability of evidence - what local records have been preserved for 
posterity. The availability of early records in Delaware and later records in Missouri skews the numbers of those 
two states. Despite this, the cases do show how most freedom suits were filed in the Upper South or Louisiana. 
They are part of 14,512 county court petitions in the Slavery Petitions Project collection published on microfilm 
by Lexis Nexis in Bethesda, Maryland. 
Alabama - 5 1 4 - 
 
5 
Arkansas - - - - - - - 
Delaware 115 10 83 2 37 3 125 
District of 
Columbia 
12 28 36 1 3 - 40 
Florida - 1 1 - - - 1 
Georgia 1 - - - 1 - 1 
Kentucky 11 48 25 15 18 1 59 
Louisiana 25 43 36 28 4 - 68 
Maryland 40 29 32 22 15 - 69 
Missouri 23 99 115 1 5 1 122 
Mississippi - - - - - - - 
North Carolina 5 3 5 - 3 - 8 
South Carolina - - - - - - - 
Tennessee 1 20 15 1 3 2 21 
Texas - - - - - - - 
Virginia 11 16 22 4 1 - 27 
 
244 302 370 75 94 7 546 
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